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The Washington Consensus suffers from fundamental inadequacies, and that a more 
comprehensive framework of the economic process is needed to guide the formulation of 
country-specific development strategies.  The following five propositions summarise the set of 
interrelated arguments made in this paper: 
1.  The Washington Consensus was based on a wrong reading of the East Asian growth 
experience.  This explains why some observers have called the trade regimes of Korea 
and Taiwan in the 1965-1980 period “free trade regimes” even though they featured 
extensive import tariffs and export subsidies.   
2.  There have been two phases to the Washington Consensus doctrine.  The mantra of the 
first phase (Washington Consensus Mark 1) is “get your prices right”, and the 
falsification of this first mantra led to the emergence of the second phase of the 
Washington Consensus doctrine.  The new mantra from the Washington Consensus Mark 
2 is “get the institutions right.”   The danger is that an elastic definition of the term 
“institutions” will render the current mantra intellectually vacuous.   
3.  While central planning went overboard in suppressing the private market economy, the 
Washington Consensus runs the danger of denying the state its rightful role in providing 
an important range of public goods.  The Washington Consensus also runs the danger of 
denying the limitations of self-help in the case of sub-Saharan Africa by overlooking the 
possibility of poverty traps.   
4.  The Washington Consensus does not understand that the ultimate engine of growth in a 
predominantly private market economy is technological innovations, and that the state 
can play a role in facilitating technological innovations.  The Washington Consensus is 
too hooked upon trade-led growth to acknowledge that science-led growth is becoming 
even more important.   
5.  The Washington Consensus does not recognize the constraints that geography and 
ecology could set on the growth potential of a country.   For example, the trade-led 
growth strategy of East Asia cannot work with the same efficiency for a landlocked 
country.  Foreign direct investment is also less likely to go to places that are malaria-
infested. 
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1 The karma of development economics 
 
The post World War II development experiences of East Asia, Latin America and Africa 
have been strikingly different. Latin Americans started off as the richest of the three regions, but 
they have now been surpassed by the best performing East Asian economies.
1 Argentina remains 
the richest Latin American economy, but its per capita income is now below those of Korea and 
Taiwan.
2 The per capita income of Malaysia is lower than those of Mexico and Venezuela when 
measured using current exchange rates, but it is higher when using PPP exchange rates.
3 
According to the Human Development Index, which is a better indicator of welfare than GDP 
per capita, Mexico’s welfare went from 0.684 in 1975 to 0.800 in 2001, Malaysia’s welfare from 
0.615 to 0.790, and Venezuela’s welfare from 0.715 to 0.775.
4  
In general, the long-run prospects for East Asia seem brighter than those for Latin 
America because the former contained many more cases with sustained high growth rates. For 
example, while China is still much poorer than El Salvador (per capita PPP-based GDP being 
$4,020 and $5,260 respectively), China  grew an average 8.2 percent annually during the 1975-
                                                 
1 This statement is correct even when we exclude Japan, see Table 1. 
2 Per capita GDP in 2001, measured using current exchange rates, was $7,166 for Argentina, $8,917 for 
Korea, and $12,876 for Taiwan. The gap is even larger when PPP exchange rates are used e.g. $11,320 
for Argentina and $15,090 for Korea. See Table 1. 
3 Using current exchange rates, per capita GDP in 2001 was $6,214 for Mexico, $5,073 for Venezuela, 
$3,699 for Malaysia, but respective PPP-based figures are $8,430, $5,670, and $8,750. This situation is 
also true for Thailand vis-à-vis Venezuela and El Salvador. 
4 The Human Development Index for Argentina was 0.784 in 1975 and 0.849 in 2001, and for Korea was 
0.701 and 0.879 respectively.   3
2001 period whereas El Salvador only grew 0.1 percent annually. This sense of optimism about 
East Asia and pessimism about Latin America was already prevalent in the early 1980s when it 
was the intellectual fad to pontificate upon the causes of this regional difference in economic 
dynamism. In 1990, John Williamson codified this litany of praise for East Asian economic 
management into Ten Commandments known collectively as the Washington Consensus to 
guide policymaking in Latin America. The Washington Consensus advocates the following 
policy stances:
5 
1.  Fiscal discipline.  
2.  A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic 
reforms and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, 
primary education, and infrastructure.  
3.  Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax bone.) 
4.  Interest rate liberalisation. 
5.  A competitive exchange rate. 
6.  Trade liberalisation. 
7.  Liberalisation of inflows of direct foreign investment. 
8.  Privatisation. 
9.  Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit).  
10. Secure property rights. 
Because Williamson formulated these ten commandments specifically for Latin America, 
and because he did not explicitly identify their intellectual ancestry, some commentators have 
assumed that these policy recommendations were derived solely from the Latin American 
                                                 
5 This summary in the format of fortune cookie slips is from Williamson (2000). This retrospective 
summary was done after much criticisms about the soundness of the Washington Consensus.    4
experience.  Such a conclusion is wrong in our opinion.  First, Williamson stated clearly that he 
was collating principles that had general professional consensus, he did not say that these 
principles had professional consensus only in Latin America.  Second, 1990 was preceded by a 
long period in which there were many widely publicised comparative analyses that included both 
Latin America and East Asia, and hence the professional consensus in 1990 Washington had to 
have been influenced by more than just the Latin American experience alone.  The proof of the 
preceding statement is that one could very easily compile Williamson's ten recommendations 
from the works of Balassa (1982), Bhagwati (1978), Edwards (1989), Krueger (1978), Lal 
(1985), Lin (1989), and Sachs (1985).
6 
In the extreme interpretation of the Washington Consensus by its popularisers, as well as 
by its critics
7, the unambiguous promise made by the Washington Consensus is that if a 
developing country were to implement conservative macroeconomic policies and liberal 
microeconomic policies to expand the role of the private market at the expense of the state in 
resource allocation, then it would achieve sustained high growth rates on its own.  
What about Africa, which was mentioned in the opening sentence of this chapter? 
Compared to the mild pessimism about Latin American economic prospects, the African 
situation has been, and remains, downright depressing. Africa has not only remained the poorest 
region, a significant part of sub-Saharan Africa has actually gotten even poorer. Per capita 
                                                 
6 For example, Lin (1989, pp. 191 and pp. 198) concluded that "many Latin American countries need to 
undertake a thorough reexamination of their basic approaches to economic development and price 
stabilisation in order to break away from the vicious circle of balance of payments crises, persistent 
inflation and sluggish economic growth ...[and to achieve a East Asian-type] virtuous circle of rapid 
export expansion, higher economic growth, and stable domestic prices."  Similarly, Edwards (1989, Table 
4.7) showed that the real exchange rates in Latin American were considerably more volatile than in East 
Asia, which means that inflation in Latin America was decreasing the reliability of price signals to 
producers, and hence decreasing their willingness to undertake investments in response to changes in 
relative prices.    
7 Williamson (2000).   5
income in sub-Saharan Africa declined 0.9 percent annually during the 1975-2001 period. Of the 
175 countries ranked by their level of human development in the Human Development Report 
2003, the 151
st (Gambia) to 175
th (Sierra Leone) places were occupied entirely by African 
countries.  
What has been the growth experience of the developing world in the 1990-2001 sub-
period when the Washington Consensus was increasing its influence over policymaking? 
Because a large number (frequently, the majority) of the sub-Saharan African countries, and a 
significant number of Latin American countries, were under Washington Consensus-based 
conditionality programmes in any given year in the 1990s, it might therefore be appropriate to 
credit the Washington Consensus for the higher growth rates in the 1990-2001 period compared 
to 1975-1989; being -0.1 percent and -1.5 percent respectively for sub-Saharan Africa, and 1.5 
percent and 0.06 percent respectively for Latin America and the Caribbean.
8 However, even if 
the Washington Consensus were the reason for the improvement in African and Latin American 
growth, one could be content with the Washington Consensus prescriptions only if one had 
dismally low expectations. The growth rates during 1990-2001 for sub-Saharan Africa (-0.1 
percent) and Latin America (1.5 percent) were still not anywhere near the 5.5 percent growth rate 
in East Asia (which was already below its growth of 6.2 percent in 1975-1989).  
Furthermore, even this low growth boost of the Washington Consensus might well be 
unsustainable and unreliable. The euphoric growth in Argentina was short-lived; it ended with 
the collapse of the currency board on January 6, 2002. Indonesia, Korea and Thailand 
implemented Washington Consensus type of policies to counter the Asian financial crisis, and 
they suffered deeper output losses for a longer period than Malaysia, which adopted capital 
controls instead.  
                                                 
8 The 1975-1989 growth rates are calculated from Table 1.   6
It is the purpose of this chapter to argue that the Washington Consensus suffers from 
fundamental inadequacies, and that a more comprehensive framework of the economic process is 
needed to guide the formulation of country-specific development strategies. The following five 
propositions summarise the particular set of interrelated arguments that we will make in the 
remainder of this chapter: 
1.  The Washington Consensus was based on a wrong reading of the East Asian growth 
experience. This explains why Deepak Lal (1985) called the trade regimes of Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1965-1980 period “free trade regimes” even though they featured extensive 
import tariffs and export subsidies.  
2.  There have been two phases to the Washington Consensus doctrine. The mantra of the 
first phase (Washington Consensus Mark 1) is “get your prices right”, and the 
falsification of this first mantra led to the emergence of the second phase of the 
Washington Consensus doctrine. The new mantra from the Washington Consensus Mark 
2 is “get the institutions right.” The danger is that an elastic definition of the term 
“institutions” will render the current mantra intellectually vacuous.  
3.  While central planning went overboard in suppressing the private market economy, the 
Washington Consensus runs the danger of denying the state its rightful role in providing 
an important range of public goods. The Washington Consensus also runs the danger of 
denying the limitations of self-help in the case of sub-Saharan Africa.  
4.  The Washington Consensus does not understand that the ultimate engine of growth in a 
predominantly private market economy is technological innovation, and that the state can 
play a role in facilitating technological innovations. The Washington Consensus is too   7
focused upon trade-led growth to acknowledge that science-led growth is becoming even 
more important.  
5.  The Washington Consensus does not recognise the constraints that geography and 
ecology could set on the growth potential of a country. For example, the trade-led growth 
strategy of East Asia cannot work with the same efficiency for a landlocked country. 
Foreign direct investment is also less likely to go to places that are malaria-infested.  
 
2 The emergence of Washington Consensus Mark 1: getting the state out 
In retrospect, Karl Marx’s famous observation on world history, when paraphrased, 
applies very well to the evolution of development economics as an academic discipline: 
development economics has repeated itself, first as tragedy in the 1960s, and second as farce in 
the 1990s. The Washington Consensus is the farce that the development establishment in 
Washington foisted upon the developing world as universal science, a status that justifies a one-
size-fits-all approach to the problems of the poor, regardless of where they are located. 
Development economics had emerged with the decolonisation that followed World War 
II as the type of economics that was applicable to developing economics, just like Keynesian 
economics was recognised to be the type of economics that was appropriate for developed 
countries, and central planning to be the best resource allocation mechanism for the new socialist 
economies. First generation development economics downplayed the applicability of 
neoclassical economics and emphasised discontinuity in economic structure and the generation 
of economic externalities as drivers of economic growth. The stages of growth hypothesis of 
Walt Rostow, the big push industrialisation strategy of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, and the circular 
and cumulative causation of Gunnar Myrdal typified this genre of thinking. The overarching   8
assumption that was based on the disastrous economic performance in the inter-war period was 
that “two hands were better than one.” A laissez-faire market economy was deemed to be 
incapable of timely self-correction and of adequate self-propulsion, and the visible hand of the 
state has to supplement the working of the invisible hand.  
First generation development economies started dying in 1970 from two main causes. 
The first cause was widespread disappointment with the growth outcomes in Latin America and 
Africa in the 1960s. The cycle of war-disease-low growth in many countries seemed undisturbed 
by the development projects implemented there.
9 
The second cause for the death of first generation development economics was the 
appearance of several multi-country studies that concluded that countries that pursued 
development strategies based on the neoclassical principle of comparative advantage grew faster 
and saw improvements in their income distribution compared with the countries with trade 
regimes that deviated substantially from the comparative advantage principle.
10 These multi-
country studies focused on the differences between economic management in East Asia and 
Latin America to provide three pillars of wisdom to serve as the foundations for a new 
generation of development economics.  
•  Pillar 1: The average effective tariff rate in East Asia was significantly lower than in 
Latin America, i.e. Latin America was more protectionist than East Asia. 
•  Pillar 2:  The variance of the effective tariff rates was much smaller in East Asia than in 
Latin America, i.e. Latin America was more prone to creating winners and losers than 
East Asia. This is because the variance could be zero only if every importable had the 
same effective tariff, which means that the composition of importables produced was 
                                                 
9 For example, see Hirschman (1981). 
10 Some of the most notable ones are Little, Scott and Scitovsky (1970), Bhagwati (1978), Krueger 
(1978), and Balassa (1982).   9
decided entirely by market forces. A large variance means that the state is actively 
influencing the production mix of importables, i.e. that the state has given a smaller role 
for market forces in resource allocation. 
•  Pillar 3:  In East Asia, the average effective tariff rate for imports was approximately 
equal to the effective rate of subsidy for exports, while in Latin America, the average 
effective tariff rate for imports greatly exceeded the effective rate of subsidy for exports. 
This means that the trade regime in East Asia makes East Asian firms indifferent between 
producing for internal market and external market, whereas the trade regime in Latin 
America makes it more profitable for the Latin American firms to sell in their domestic 
markets than to sell in the external markets 
The abovementioned implications of Pillar 3 can be more clearly seen when we consider 
equation (1) below, which shows the relationship between the domestic prices and the world 
prices of importables and exportables: 
(PI/PX) = PWI(1+t) / PWX(1+s) (1) 
PI = domestic price of importables 
PX = domestic price of exportables 
PWI = world price of imports 
PWX = domestic price of exports 
t = effective tariff rate on imports > 0 
s = effective subsidy rate on exports > 0 
In a market economy with only these two goods, if the ratio (PI/PX) rises, say, because of 
a rise in t (or a fall in s), then producers will switch to making importables from exportables. So 
when the state sets t > s, then it is encouraging the production of importables – this is the case of   10
Latin American. From pillar 2, we know that the Latin Americans were also varying the tariff 
rates across sectors in order to influence the composition of importables that was being 
produced.  
In the situation where t = s > 0, which is the case of East Asia, then equation (1) reduces 
to: 
(PI/PX) = PWI / PWX   (2)  
which is the same situation of free trade where t = s = 0. Furthermore, Pillar 2 tells us that 
the low variance in the distribution of the tariff and subsidy rates in East Asia indicates that the 
state was allowing market forces to determine the composition of importables and exportables 
made by domestic manufacturers. The equality between s and t, and the limited dispersion in the 
values of s and t might be why Deepak Lal (1985) has described the East Asian trade regimes as 
“free trade” even though they had positive tariff rates and positive export subsidy rates. 
The important analytical difference is that the incentive system in East Asia is neutral 
toward the production of importables and exportables, while the incentive system in Latin 
America favours the production of importables. In a strange, asymmetrical use of terminology, 
these large-scale comparative studies labeled the seemingly neutral trade regime in East Asia 
with terms like “export-promotion trade regime” and “outward-oriented trade regime”, and 
accurately labelled the biased trade regime in Latin America as “import substitution trade 
regime” and “inward-oriented trade regime.”  
Since the economic growth in East Asia was higher than in Latin America, and was 
accompanied by fewer inflation and balance of payments crises, it was therefore quite natural 
that the superior performance of East Asia was attributed to the greater role that market forces 
there had in resource allocation. The operational principle lesson distilled by the World Bank and   11
the IMF from these comparative studies is captured by the now famous mantra of Washington 
Consensus Mark 1 “get the prices right.” At the macroeconomic level, the state should aim for 
general price stability by keeping the growth of money and the budget deficit low (say, at the rate 
of real GDP growth), and introduce exchange rate flexibility by deregulating balance-of-
payments transactions, and allow market-clearing interest rates by liberalising the financial 
sector. At the microeconomic level, the state should not only remove restrictions on price-setting, 
and on entry and exit into businesses, but also reduce state subsidies and privatise state-owned 
companies. These policies are essentially the Ten Commandments of the Washington Consensus 
promulgated by John Williamson in 1990. 
To be fair, it must be mentioned that the term “Washington Consensus” has now assumed 
meanings beyond what John Williamson might have had in mind in 1990 – he was certainly in 
favour of some withdrawal of the state in the economic sphere but he would not have favoured 
the total withdrawal of the state. For example, Williamson (2000) said that he had not mentioned 
capital account liberalisation in 1990, even though this was an operational objective that the IMF 
had been advocating at least since the late 1980s
11 (but, now, not with the same stridency). In any 
case, the term “Washington Consensus” has, in many popular discussions, come to be identified 
with what George Soros (1998) has called “market fundamentalism”, and thus become the 
pejorative title of the second generation of development economics. 
Unlike first generation development economics that considered itself an alternative to 
neoclassical economics, second generation development economics is happy to pronounce itself 
                                                 
11 It therefore appears that the IMF was the practitioner of a more market-oriented version of the 
Washington Consensus that what Williamson was advocating. According to Williamson (2000), “[this 
version of] the Washington Consensus consists of the set of policies endorsed by the principal economic 
institutions located in Washington: the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. I would argue that the policies these institutions advocated in the 
1990s were inimical to the cause of poverty reduction in emerging markets in at least one respect: their 
advocacy of capital account liberalisation.”    12
an applied branch of neoclassical economics.
12 This fate of development economics was also 
experienced by the other alternatives that had emerged or became more widespread after World 
War II. Keynesian economics has been overthrown by the Monetarist Counter-Revolution led by 
Milton Friedman, and the New Classical Revival led by Robert Lucas. Central planning has 
disappeared not only in Eastern Europe but also in the land of its origin. 
The tragedy about the demise of first generation development economics is that some 
very good insights about the growth process were subsequently ignored in policy discussions and 
in the academic literature. Recent advancements in methodology and recent increases in 
empirical knowledge on a broad front in economic analysis have restored intellectual 
respectability to a few key propositions of first generation economics. Andrei Shleifer has 
succeeded in formulating the big push hypothesis in a mathematically tractable form, and Paul 
Romer has revived the circular and cumulative causation mechanism to be the central piece of 
the new endogenous growth models. Jeffrey Sachs et al. (2004) have explicated the dynamics of 
development traps so convincingly that these ideas are now guiding the implementation of the 
just-initiated Millennium Development Goals (MDG) project of the United Nations.
13  
The farce of second generation development economics, as exemplified by the 
Washington Consensus (especially the Mark 1 version), is occurring on two levels: in theory and 
in practice. As the farce is still an ongoing play at the moment, it deserves its own section to 
enable a more detailed discussion. 
 
                                                 
12 The triumph of neo-classical economics over first generation development economics is analysed in 
detail in Woo (1990). 
13 The MDG project seeks to mobilise sufficient international aid to make drastic and self-sustained 
improvements in the living standards of the world’s poorest people, e.g., halving the rate of absolute 
poverty by 2015.    13
3.   The emergence of Washington Consensus Mark 2: bringing the state back in 
The farce of second-generation development economics at the theory level is that 
Washington Consensus Mark 1 is based upon an incorrect reading of the evidence presented in 
the various multi-country studies on the effects of the trade regime choice. This incorrect reading 
arises from the fact that an economy produces non-tradable goods as well as the tradable goods 
of importables and exportables. This means that a rise in the tariff rate will not just mean the 
production of more importables at the expense of exportables, it will also mean a decline in the 
amount of non-tradables produced. Since changes in the tariff rates and subsidy rates will affect 
the production of non-tradables, this means that the allocation effects of the case where t = s > 0 
(the outward-oriented trade regime case) will be different from the case where t = s = 0 (the free 
trade case). In short, it was wrong for Deepak Lal (1985) to equate the outward-oriented trade 
regime with free trade, and it was also wrong for the World Bank to call it “neutral incentive 
policy.” 
The preceding discussion can be formalised as follows, by first introducing the following 
notations: 
PT = domestic price of tradables 
PN = domestic price of non-tradables 
PWT = world price of tradables 
and then making the following definitions in equations (3) and (4): 
PT = aPI + (1-a)PX where 0 < a < 1   (3) 
PWT = aPWI + (1-a)PWX   (4) 
Using equation (1), we can rewrite equation (3) in the form of equation (5):  
PT = aPWI (1+t) + (1-a)PWX (1+s)   (5)   14
For the special case when s = t > 0 as in the outward-oriented trade regime (OORT), 
equation (5) reduces to equation (6): 
PT = (1+t)PWT under OORT   (6) 
When we compare the ratio of price of tradables to the price of non-tradables under 
OORT and with the ratio of these prices under free trade, we find that the former is larger than 
the latter, as given in equation (7): 
(PT/PN) under OORT = [(1+t)(PWT)/PN] > [PWT/PN] = (PT/PN) under free trade  (7) 
The conclusion from equation (7) is that the OORT increases the production of tradables 
at the expense of non-tradables. It means that the alleged salubrious growth effects of the OORT 
come not from the effects of the import tariffs and export subsidies serendipitously cancelling 
each other out (hence producing a free trade outcome) but from the diminution of the non-
tradable sector. It is therefore wrong, as has been frequently done, to use the empirical studies of 
Little et al., Bhagwati, Krueger and Balassa to justify market fundamentalism.  
The interesting question is why has the OORT been good for growth? Because the largest 
component of non-tradable activities in many developing economies is subsistence agriculture, 
OORT by increasing the profitability of the manufacturing sector accelerates the industrialisation 
process and hence quickens the absorption of surplus agricultural labour. Another possible 
growth mechanism is that by making activities in the tradable industries more financially 
rewarding, it focuses the minds of the entrepreneurs to participate more actively in the 
international product cycle, resulting in faster diffusion of foreign technology to these 
developing countries. 
Perhaps what really did Washington Consensus Mark 1 in was that it was also a farce in 
practice. First, the application of second-generation development economics has not appeared to   15
have effected more positive outcomes in Latin America (with the possible exception of Chile) 
and Africa. Macroeconomic storms in Latin America have continued unabated in frequency and 
in depth. And negative growth has continued to be the norm in Africa. The East Asians 
continued to have higher growth rates, albeit that they suffered a serious region-wide crisis in 
1997-1999 thanks to the capital account liberalisation started in the early 1990s. 
Second, the large-scale economic deregulation spurred on by the Washington Consensus 
backfired much more frequently than expected. The removal of interest rate ceilings and entry 
barriers into the banking system turned out to be very costly in many countries. The explosion in 
the number of banks and the total loan value often fuelled excessive speculation and created 
large amounts of nonperforming loans, developments that bankrupted the banking system. In 
almost every case, the government stepped in to refund the depositors in order to prevent a 
meltdown of the economy, of social order, and of its political status. Equally egregiously, the 
privatisation of state assets many times meant sales at heavily discounted prices to political 
cronies of the ruling party, and the replacement of public monopolies by private monopolies. 
Basically, in some countries, the Washington Consensus was used to camouflage the looting of 
the state and the embezzlement of the general public. 
The economic transition of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) from 
centrally-planned economies to market economies that started in 1990, and the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-99 also discredited Washington Consensus Mark 1 in public perception. Joseph 
Stiglitz, former chairman of the US President’s Council of Economic Advisors, former Chief 
Economist of the World Bank, and Nobel laureate in economics, has excoriated the Washington 
Consensus-inspired IMF programmes for causing the sizeable output losses in both episodes. 
The collapse of the Argentinean economy in 2002 was particularly damaging because the IMF   16
had taken credit earlier for the uncharacteristically strong growth that began with the 
establishment of the currency board on April 1, 1991. 
One pretty widespread interpretation of the output decline in EEFSU is that their 
comprehensive deregulation did not create the expected improvements in welfare because these 
countries lacked the institutional infrastructure that was necessary for the satisfactory working of 
a market economy.
14 To cite a few examples of the long list of necessary capitalist (or, capitalist-
style) institutions, the EEFSU in 1990 had: 
•  no independent, qualified judiciary systems to settle commercial disputes, enforce 
contracts, protect the rights of minority shareholders, enforce competition policies more 
conscientiously, and oversee orderly restructuring of bankrupt companies. 
•  no corruption-free, competent securities regulatory commissions to monitor the integrity 
of transactions in the stock markets, and improve the transparency of corporate 
governance. 
•  no effective, honest financial sector oversight boards to formulate appropriate risk-
exposure standards for the financial industry, strengthen prudential regulations, and 
supervise adherence to these standards and regulations. 
•  no higher education facilities that could impart to existing and new managers the skills 
(e.g. accounting practices that are in accordance with international norms) that are 
necessary to run their enterprises in the new market economies. 
In many countries, the government was in complete disarray, not only because the 
operational procedures of the bureaucracy lagged behind the sweeping legal changes, but also 
because the accompanying political revolution caused confusion over the lines of authority 
                                                 
14 See Cornia and Popov (2001).   17
within ministries and over the division of responsibilities across the re-organised ministries. 
Furthermore, during this chaos, many bureaucrats took the opportunity to grab the state assets 
that they had supervisory responsibility for, thereby worsening the economic disintegration. 
With this calamity in EEFSU so recent in memory, it was perhaps inevitable that one 
common knee-jerk diagnosis of the 1997 Asian financial crisis was that it had been caused by 
crony capitalism. In particular, the lack of arm-length transactions between the Asian banks and 
their biggest shareholders and borrowers (a situation enabled by the patronage practices of the 
political systems in these countries) resulted in irrationally large amounts of investments directed 
to high-risk projects, prestige projects, and projects kept viable by regulations. The meltdown of 
the Asian financial crisis came when investors fled into foreign assets upon recognition that the 
contingent losses had exceeded the fiscal ability and political willingness of the state to bail out 
these projects. The claim, in short, was that the absence of market infrastructural institutions (e.g. 
an honest, capable state financial supervisory body) had caused the East Asian economies to 
implode in the same way that the EEFSU had earlier. 
Once caught in the mindset of “institution mania”, the reason for the collapse of the 
Argentinean currency board is a no-brainer: the currency board was obviously the wrong 
economic institution for Argentinean circumstances, the right institution (by definition) would 
not have failed. Institutional mania has continued to strengthen since; it has now in fact become 
the new linchpin in the revised Washington Consensus. John Williamson, the primogenitor of the 
Washington Consensus, had this to say ten years after reporting the apparent phenomenon of 
intellectual convergence in the discipline of development economics: 
“I have a somewhat different view [from my critics e.g. Joseph Stiglitz] of what 
should be added to the Washington Consensus to make it a policy manifesto 
supportive of egalitarian, environmentally sensitive development ..... [My] 
emphasis would have been different; I would have focused much more generally   18
on institutions .... The major advance of the 1990s stemmed from recognition that 
the central task of the transition from communism to market-based economies 
involved building the institutional infrastructure of a market economy. This 
realisation was complemented by a growing recognition that bad institutions can 
sabotage good policies.” (Williamson, 2000, pp. 260-261). 
 
The new mantra of the revised Washington Consensus (i.e. Washington Consensus Mark 
2) is undoubtedly “get the institutions right.” Washington Consensus Mark 2 might turn out to be 
no more correct that its predecessor but it is certainly much more ambitious in scope. It not only 
promises us a richer world but a fairer and greener one as well. Dani Rodrik (well-known for his 
rejection of the “get the prices right” approach) has vouched for the intellectual respectability of 
this new policy wisdom. He and his co-authors have produced empirical evidence to show that 
only institutions mattered for economic growth (“the quality of institutions ‘trumps’ everything 
else”); not trade regime, and not geography.
15  
This unearthing of the one variable that explains all that is about growth is certainly 
startling, especially since Dani Rodrik had always been on the forefront of reminding the 
development economics profession about how very much more remains to be understood, and 
how complex the world really is. However, what is equally startling about Washington 
Consensus Mark 2 but has received surprisingly little attention is that it has now reversed the role 
of the government. Washington Consensus Mark 1 concentrated on jettisoning the government 
out of economic life, and Washington Consensus Mark 2 now brings it back to the centre stage to 
be the conductor of the economic orchestra, providing and maintaining the infrastructure that 
enables a private market economy to operate effectively. The only crucial aspect on the state that 
Washington Consensus Mark 2 shares with Washington Consensus Mark 1 (in the literal sense) 
is: without the government, there will be no music to face. 
                                                 
15 Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi (2002) wrote: “We estimate the respective contributions of 
institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world .... Our results indicate 
that the quality of institutions 'trumps' everything else.”   19
 
4  A critique of the logical and empirical foundations of Washington Consensus Mark 2 
In our assessment, Washington Consensus Mark 2 is founded on two non-existent pillars:  
1.  the single-variable explanation of growth; and 
2.  the absence of good capitalist-style institutions (i.e. software like bankruptcy courts, 
transparent accounting standards) as the reason for the output collapses in EEFSU during 
1990-1993, and in East Asia in 1997-1998. 
We think that it is reasonable to start with the premise that economic growth is difficult to 
understand. If this were not the case, the whole world would be rich already. One enduring 
lesson that painful experience has taught scholars of economic growth is that the dazzlingly 
bright idea of the moment about what specific factor really causes economic growth will 
inevitably turn out to be just another blinding insight, where the cleverness of the idea blinds us 
temporarily to the partial nature of the correctness of the explanation—applicable only to a small 
sub-sample of countries, and then only for a limited sub-period in their history. The one thing 
about economic growth that we can be reasonably sure about, despite our admittedly incomplete 
understanding of the phenomenon, is that no single variable, or two – or even three – variables, 
can constitute an adequate explanation. The most optimistic and kind remark that one can make 
about any big idea currently in vogue is that it deserves incorporation into the melting pot of 
ideas. 
Assuming that we know at least four of the variables that influence economic growth, 
then one simple characterisation of economic growth could be equation (8): 
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where  y= trend growth rate of output;  i x  = factor i ;  i a = (relative) impact that factor i  
exerts on the growth rate; and e= residual factors (a measure of our ignorance). 
However, because many examples suggest that economic growth could be a more 
complex process than the simple weighted sum of each individual factor, economic growth could 
well be a non-linear function of the four variables, as given, for example, by the sum of three 
composite terms in equation (9): 
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where  i b and c are technical coefficients, and ε  is the new measure of our ignorance. 
Specification ) 9 ( is interesting because it allows large output changes to occur for a tiny 
change in any one of the i x ; it also imposes prerequisites in order for a high growth rate to occur. 
The second and third composite terms become influential only when  4 x  switches from zero to a 
positive value; a real world equivalent of  4 x  could, for example, be “law and order.” The third 
composite term has no influence on growth when any one of the  i x  is zero, denying economic 
growth the “synergy effects” from virtuous circle type of interactions.  
In a context where many (say, n) variables determine the growth rate, one way that any 
single variable can be said to ‘trump’ all other variables is when the growth specification is of 
the form in equation (10): 
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As long as xinstitution is zero, y will always be zero regardless of the values of any of the xi. 
On a priori grounds, we reject equation (10) as lacking in intuitive appeal. On a posteriori   21
grounds, we reject equation (10) on our past dismal experiences with single-variable 
explanations of growth, e.g. we have now gotten over the confusion that Confucian values 
constituted the cause of higher growth in East Asia vis-à-vis Latin America, and that class 
struggle is the only driver of history. In any case, it is certainly too early and imprudent to allow 
the single study by Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi (2002) to resolve this single-variable issue. 
The fact that China and Vietnam experienced rapid sustained growth upon their adoption 
of market-oriented reforms despite the same absence of effective capitalist-style institutions as in 
EEFSU shows that the institutional explanation for output fall in EEFSU might be of secondary 
importance. Let us quickly add that the growth performance across the two regions cannot be 
attributed to a difference in the speed of reform either. Both China and Ukraine implemented 
their reform gradually but output fell precipitously in Ukraine. Both Poland and Vietnam 
implemented “big-bang” reforms but output immediately soared in Vietnam.
16 
The real difference between the socialist states in East Asia and the formerly socialist 
states in Eastern Europe is that they had very different economic production structures at the 
time when they each initiated market reforms.
17 Vietnam and China were primarily subsistence 
peasant economies, with over 75 percent of their labour force in the agricultural sector, which 
was marked by widespread underemployment. Poland and Russia were on the other hand already 
urbanised, industrialised, fully-employed economies, with state subsidies maintaining an overly 
large heavy industrial sector. Less than 20 percent of the Russian labour force was engaged in 
agricultural activities. Finally, China’s reforms did not start in a situation with a severe 
macroeconomic crisis and a severe external debt crisis that required the implementation of an 
austerity programme.  
                                                 
16 See Woo (2003). 
17 See Sachs and Woo (1994), and Woo, Parker and Sachs (1996).   22
When the economic reforms freed prices, cut state subsidies, and legalised the non-state 
sector, new rural industrial enterprises and new urban non-state service firms sprung up in China 
to employ the idle agriculture labour, while the artificially large heavy industrial sector in Poland 
and Russia collapsed because, first, the market-determined composition of demand did not 
require so much heavy industrial products, and, second, it was no longer receiving the same 
amount of subsidies as before. 
The labour for the new Chinese enterprises came entirely from the agricultural sector. 
Workers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) did not shift to the non-state enterprises because, 
thanks to various subsidies from the government, SOEs paid higher wages. SOEs provided 
generous pensions, and heavily-subsidised housing, medical coverage, child-care, food and 
recreational facilities. The Chinese peasants, receiving none of these benefits and consuming 
only one-third of what urban residents consumed, were hence only too glad to shift out of low-
income agricultural activities to the new higher-income jobs (which paid less than SOE jobs but 
higher than agricultural jobs).  
In Russia, over 80 percent of the population were urban residents and SOE employees. 
Furthermore, Russian farmers receive the same income as SOE workers. So when the new non-
state sector was legalised, a SOE worker or farmer shifting into it would experience a drop in 
income because he would no longer receive the various subsidies and would pay taxes to support 
the subsidies to the SOEs. The point is that unless the subsidies to the SOEs are ended, there will 
be no voluntary movement by workers from the state enterprises to the new non-state 
enterprises.
18 
                                                 
18 The fact is that, unlike in Russia and Poland, there was no flow of workers from China’s SOEs to the 
new non-state enterprises. The proportion of the Chinese labour force employed by state-owned units was 
18 percent in 1978 and it was still 18 percent in 1992. This means that there were 32 million more 
Chinese working in state-owned units in 1992 than in 1978.   23
The very different results that we see in China, Vietnam, Poland and Russia immediately 
after the implementation of economic reform programmes came more from their differences in 
economic structure than from the presence of effective capitalist-style economic institutions in 
China and Vietnam, and their absence in EEFSU. China’s reform problem is the classic 
development problem of moving surplus agricultural labour into industries, while Eastern 
Europe’s and Russia’s reform problem is the classic adjustment problem of moving employed 
labour from uncompetitive industries to newly-emerging efficient industries. The fact is that 
economic development is easier than economic adjustment, both practically and politically, even 
in the absence of efficient capitalist-style institutions. 
 How about the “inadequate institutions (soft rot)” explanation for the Asian financial 
crisis? Well, there is an alternative to it: the financial contagion (speculative mania) explanation. 
The claim of this alternative explanation is that just as external creditors had been excessively 
optimistic about economic prospects earlier in 1994-1996,
19 they became overly pessimistic at 
the end of 1997. If irrational exuberance exists, as Alan Greenspan warns, then irrational 
melancholia must also occur occasionally. 
The simultaneous nature and the regional nature of the financial crisis suggest that weak 
internal economic fundamentals cannot be the only significant explanation of the crisis. It is hard 
to believe that the soft rot in the different countries would coincidentally cause these 
neighbouring economies to collapse within a few months of each other. Such coincidence would 
be as plausible as the facetious suggestion that the warranties for Asian capitalism had 
simultaneously expired in mid-1997. We think that it is more reasonable to conclude that while 
                                                 
19 The facts are that foreign capital inflows into these four countries had been increasing every year since 
1991, and heavy capital outflows from Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea started only in the last quarter of 
1997. The outflow was so large in the last quarter that the net inflow for the whole year was negative. The 
reversal in capital flows between 1996 and 1997 amounted to about 10 percent of their pre-crisis GDP.    24
soft rot existed in different degrees in all Asian countries, it was a financial contagion that 
brought about the crisis.
20 
Enough time has passed that we can now say with greater certainty that financial panic is 
a better explanation for the Asian financial crisis than the soft rot explanation. This is because if 
the crises were caused by soft rot, then economic rebound would occur only after fundamental 
economic restructuring has been largely accomplished. In short, the soft rot explanation would 
necessitate a U-shape movement in GDP. On the other hand, if financial contagion were the 
primary reason for the economic collapse in these countries, then their output would rebound 
right after the panic is over. This was the experience of Argentina in 1995, Mexico in 1995, and 
Turkey in 1994 when they experienced financial panics. The financial contagion explanation 
would predict a V-shape in GDP movement, and this is exactly what happened in Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand in 1999-2000.
21  
We have examined the flawed institutions explanation for the output losses in EEFSU 
and in the Asian financial crisis, and in each case we have found more convincing alternative 
explanations. This implausibility of Washington Consensus Mark 2 at the intuitive a priori level, 
and as the explanation for the EEFSU and Asian crises of the 1990s leads us to conclude that the 
complexity of the world cannot be usefully understood by constantly searching for the single 
truth that would set us free in a richer, fairer and greener world. 
 
                                                 
20 The existence of speculative mania does not mean the violation of the rational expectations assumption 
(that agents exploit their information sets optimally and know the economic structure). Woo (1987) gives 
evidence of rational speculative bubbles in foreign exchange markets.  
21 See Woo (2000a, 2000b), and Woo, Sachs and Schwab (2000) for details on the Asian financial crisis.   25
5  Beyond the Washington Consensus to misunderstand the poor 
It is a rather big mystery why economists have generally paid very little attention to the 
role of geography in economic development even when, on a global scale, the wealth of nations 
is well characterised by two geographical divides. The first geographical divide emphasises 
differences in ecological conditions: the temperate zone versus the tropical zone. The second 
geographical divide emphasises differences in the ability to conduct international trade: the coast 
versus the interior.  
The empirical validity of the temperate–tropical divide is supported by the fact that over 
90 percent of the world’s poor lives between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. 
The result is a GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) of $3,326 in 1995 for tropical economies, and 
$9,027 for non-tropical economies. This strong correlation between ecological zone and income 
level is not a new observation in economics, e.g. Lee (1957) and Kamarck (1976), but it has not 
been a major analytical organising principle in development economics.  
The coast–interior dichotomy highlights the importance of transportation costs in 
determining a country’s participation in the international division of labour. In the industrial age, 
water transportation has the lowest cost for moving goods over extended distance. The growth 
effects of trade are well known, beginning with Adam Smith’s observation that productivity 
improvements are enabled by the greater division of labour that, in turn, is enabled by the 
expansion of the market. The clear policy lesson here is that investments in physical 
infrastructure and transportation technology can change the comparative advantage of a region.  
The above configuration of spatial inequality suggests to us the possibility that both of 
these geographical divides are a combination of independent causes of economic wealth and of 
proxies for some important determinants of economic prosperity. For example, there could be a   26
“biological” dimension to the growth phenomenon as proposed by natural scientists. In the book, 
Guns, Germs and Steel, the physiologist Jared Diamond (1997) has demonstrated that many 
types of innovation (especially those in agriculture and construction) are not transferable across 
ecological zones. So, in ancient times, while improved varieties of crops and beasts of burden 
could spread from northern Asia in the East to Europe in the West (and vice versa), they could 
not be transmitted from the temperate zone in North America to the temperate zone in South 
America because of the intervening tropics. Biological endowments also matter. Most areas of 
Asia and Europe have more naturally pliable livestock (horses and cows) that can be harnessed 
to help in war and production. The African-equivalent of those animals, for example, zebras, 
hippopotamuses, antelopes, and wildebeests, have proved themselves, up to today, resistant to 
efforts to turn them into beasts of burden. Even the African elephant is temperamentally 
uncooperative compared to its Asian cousin. 
Some economists, Landes (1998), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), and Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1999), have begun to incorporate the new insights on physical geography to explore 
whether physical geography was an overarching explanation of economic performance. For 
example, Bloom and Sachs (1998) presented rigorous statistical testing to conclude that the 
virulence of diseases and the limited potential for large gains in agricultural productivity in the 
tropics to be the key obstacles to economic development in most areas of Africa.
22  
This biology-based analysis is of course not the only recent attempt to explain the upward 
income gradient that begins at the equator. Institutional mania has struck here as well. Hall and 
Jones (1999) have suggested instead that the distance from the equator proxies for the relative 
                                                 
22 It is therefore noteworthy that the southern border of China extends only a few miles beyond the Tropic 
of Cancer. Is it more than coincidental that after one thousand years, 800 B.C. to 200 A.D., of aggressive 
southward expansion from the Yellow River valley, the Chinese southern border has not changed for 
about one thousand eight hundred years? The borders stopped at approximately where the tropical zone, 
i.e. the malaria zone begins.   27
penetration of European economic institutions and that European-style economic institutions are 
the ultimate engines of growth.  
How plausible is the explanation of the institutional fundamentalists? Well, if they are 
right, then it is quite inscrutable that Japan is considerably richer than Nigeria and Mexico. Japan 
is further away from Europe and North America than Nigeria is from Europe, and, furthermore, 
Nigeria, being a former British colony, had direct transfer of institutions from Britain. Mexico is 
right next to the United States, and it had also undergone a total transformation to European 
institutions three centuries before the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan.  
There is clearly no shortage of explanations for spatial income disparity and its durability. 
The great surfeit of views is suggestive of inadequate understanding about this phenomenon and 
of confusion about what to do about it. What is clear, however, is that the successful 
development strategies of some countries cannot produce the same salubrious results when 
implemented in other national settings. When China opened some coastal pockets for foreign 
direct investment, these Special Economic Zones (SEZs) quickly blossomed into vibrant export 
platforms and created backward linkages with the immediate hinterland. When landlocked 
Mongolia turned the entire country into a free trade and investment zone in the late 1990s, 
however, the inflow of foreign capital was a mere trickle compared to China’s experience. The 
specific lesson in this case is that the time-tested effective growth policy package for a coastal 
economy, and minor modifications of it, are unlikely to work for an interior economy. 
Hereby, we see another fundamental flaw in the Washington Consensus development 
paradigm touted by the international financial and development institutions. Their development 
paradigm is most effective for small economies like Hong Kong and Singapore and for mid-size 
economies like Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan (with easy access to shipping) which can   28
participate fully in the international division of labour, and which had earlier accumulated 
relatively high level of human capital stocks (measured in education and health terms). When we 
review, in the context of Swiss economic history, the largely dismal growth performance of 
landlocked Bolivia, Burundi, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Rwanda, and Zambia, it appears that their 
fates are very much dependent on the growth rates and prosperity levels of their surrounding 
neighbours. But then these countries are all surrounded by other poor countries. In the absence of 
high demand by the neighbours for their products, we think that dealing successfully with the 
developmental changes arising from physical isolation and local disease vectors are just as 
important as “getting the prices right” and “getting the institutions right.” 
However, it is also clear from history that geography need not be destiny. Our guarded 
optimism is based on the fact that every geographically large country in the world has enduring 
pockets of regional poverty, e.g. Northern Shaanxi in China, Chiapas in Mexico, Madura in 
Indonesia, but the United States has been successful in reducing this problem. Despite the great 
geographical diversity of the United States, the per capita income in different states has actually 
been converging to a common income level; or, in technical parlance, there is unconditional 
convergence of income within the United States. Even more optimistically for the developing 
world, the process of unconditional convergence of income has also been verified for Western 
Europe. 
Our optimism, however, is tempered by the knowledge that the process of absolute 
convergence of income is not operating within China. Most studies on China’s regional growth 
have found the existence of conditional convergence instead, which is that China could be 
described as a collection of regions each with a different long-run equilibrium income level, and 
provinces within each region are converging to its own region-specific equilibrium income level.   29
There are, however, also studies, e.g. Démurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao, Chang, and Mellinger (2002), 
that found no reliable evidence of any kind of income convergence, whether unconditional or 
conditional.  
There was nothing automatic about the catching up phenomenon in the United States, it 
occurred because of the massive state investments in the poor regions, e.g. rural electrification, 
an extensive national transportation system, large-scale water works projects implemented 
through the Army Corp of Engineers, the widespread land grant university system at the state 
level. The establishment of land grant universities in the poorer states was particularly important 
because it not only increased human capital formation but also mobilised science to overcome 
the ecology-specific barriers to higher productivity yield in agriculture and to better health within 
the local populations.  
This comparative regional development experience in the United States and China 
reveals two more fundamental flaws in the Washington Consensus development prescriptions: (i) 
no recognition of the poverty trap phenomenon; and (ii) no acknowledgement of the importance 
of technical innovations. 
The Washington Consensus believes only in self-help, it has no mention of foreign aid at 
all. Presumably, its position is that foreign assistance might accelerate the income convergence 
process but the country’s actions alone will be enough to initiate this process. To see that the 
Washington Consensus’s position is wrong, we ask: why hasn’t China already undertaken the 
same large-scale regional investments that the US did in the early parts of the 20th century? The 
answer is straightforward: China has not been able to afford to make these investments until 
recently. China had to wait until the economic deregulation, and the resulting integration of the 
coastal provinces into the international division of labour had created so much new wealth (not at   30
the expense of the inland provinces) that it finally had the fiscal ability do so. China is solving its 
regional poverty through self-help only in the sense that the richer provinces are subsidising the 
poorer ones (as the US did in the past), it is not relying on each province to pull itself up by its 
own bootstraps solely through the tonic mix of right prices and right institutions. 
If we now consider an extremely destitute medium-size country that has no vibrant 
income growth in any of its provinces, the scope for cross-region subsidies is non-existent. It is 
therefore conceivable that some desperately poor countries are caught in poverty traps from 
which they cannot escape because they are too poor to make the critical amount of investments 
that will free them from the interlocking vicious cycles of illiteracy and poverty, and of disease 
and poverty.
23 Unless the rich nations are willing to live up to their moral obligations and grant 
sustained aid to change what Ocampo (2004) has called the ‘framework conditions’ of these 
penurious societies, these societies will remain mired in misery. 
We suspect that many sub-Saharan countries, especially the landlocked ones like Malawi, 
Burkina Faso, and Zambia, are caught in the bind of poverty traps. Good internal governance 
(with both prices and institutions being right) alone will not generate a satisfactory rate of 
sustained growth; it has to be supplemented by adequate external aid in order for faster growth to 
happen. The self-help logo of the Washington Consensus, when used indiscriminately, can serve 
as a cover for moral callousness.  
The second fundamental failing of the Washington Consensus revealed by the US-China 
comparison (particularly, the founding of the extensive land grant university system) is its static 
                                                 
23 One side of the disease-poverty circle is that people fall sick, incur expenses that thrust them into debt, 
possibly lose their jobs because of sickness-induced low performance or absenteeism, and finally sink 
into poverty. The other side is that poor people cannot afford the required medical care and preventive 
screening, and fall sick more frequently (and, possibly also become sick more seriously) compared to the 
non-poor. The illiteracy-poverty vicious cycle can operate across generations rather as well as within a 
generation. The extremely poor cannot afford to educate their children, and in the absence of work skills 
these children obtain only the lowest-paying jobs or become subsistence farmers.   31
view of the economic process. This failure of the Washington Consensus can be characterised as 
“seeing the forest but not the trees.” Specifically, while the Washington Consensus imputes 
numerous positive growth effects to increasing the degree of trade openness as measured by the 
export-GDP ratio, and points out that East Asia is more trade-oriented than Latin America (see 
Figures 1 to 3)
24, it has not noticed, that the export composition of East Asia shows even greater 
economic dynamism than the rise in the export-GDP ratio (see Figures 4 to 11).
25 In East Asia, 
higher value added manufactured exports have been displacing lower value added manufactured 
exports (and, in some cases, agricultural exports) very rapidly, whereas in most of Latin 
America, the composition of manufactured exports has been stable even when there is the rise in 
the export-GDP ratio.
26 Mexico is the only large country in Latin America that shows the East 
Asia trait of the rise in the export-GDP ratio being driven by high value added manufactured 
exports – a development that began in 1987 and intensified in 1993 when NAFTA was 
established.
27  
The rapid evolution in the composition of manufactured exports in Korea, Taiwan and 
Malaysia reflects the steady and dramatic pace of industrial upgrading in these countries. This 
continual transformation of their production structures reveals the effectiveness of the 
                                                 
24 The average export-GDP ratio for East Asia went from 35 to 63 percent, for Africa from 22 to 29 
percent, and for Latin America from 9 to 20 percent, see  Figure 1.  For this calculation, East Asia 
consisted of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; Africa of 
Gabon, Ghana, Cote Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal; and Latin America of Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico. Taiwan, Argentina and Brazil were excluded because of missing data.  
25 In Figures 4 to 11, the notations are as follows: Manu = manufactured exports, Total = total exports, 
Manu A = low-tech manufactured exports, Manu B = high-tech manufactured exports, Ag = agricultural 
exports, and Mine = mineral exports. 
26 For example, see Figure 4, when (Manu/Total) of Argentina rose from 11 percent in 1970 to 30 percent 
in 1997, (Manu A/Total) went from 6 percent to 13 percent, and (Manu B/Total) from 5 percent to 13 
percent.  The result was only a minor change in Argentina’s composition of manufactured exports. 
Whereas in Korea’s case, as (Manu/Total) stayed about the same over the 1970-1997 period (76 percent 
in 1970 and 71 percent in 1997), (Manu A/Total) fell from 54 percent to 22 percent, and (Manu B/Total) 
climbed from 22 percent to 49 percent.  
27 See Figure 2 and 11.   32
technology policies adopted there. These countries have adopted aggressive concessionary 
policies to incubate high-tech firms, and to attract high-tech investments by multinational 
corporations. The upshot is that the typical Latin American country is richer than the typical East 
Asian country, but the technology level of the former is lower! For example, Table 2 shows that 
the sample of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico is 48 percent richer than the sample of 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines, but the technology level of the former is 24 percent lower 
than that of the latter. So the usual image of East Asia being more laissez-faire than Latin 
America is certainly not true. Latin America either does not have a technology policy, or has one 
that does not work as desired, e.g. the standard import-substituting industrialisation policy is a 
negative technology policy because it discourages participation in the international product 
cycle.
28 
In short, what has been described as trade-led growth in East Asia could instead be called 
science-led growth. For many of the least developed economies, where agriculture would 
continue to be the mainstay of their economies, employing the bulk of the population, the 
developed countries should focus a large part of their increased aid on raising agricultural 
productivity and demand for the agricultural output through the application of science, 
establishing regional agriculture research centres for each of the distinct ecosystems in the least 
developed countries (e.g. tropical monsoon region of East Asia, high plateau area of Latin 
America, and tropical grassland territory of Africa) to: 
•  conduct research on new seed varieties (including agro biotechnology), new approaches 
to water and environmental management, and new approaches to agricultural 
mechanisation. 
                                                 
28 For a recent discussion about the state of innovation systems and technological development in Latin 
America and the policies required to strengthen them, see Chapter 7 in ECLAC (2002), and Chapter 6 in 
ECLAC (2004).   33
•  improve the local livestock through cross-breeding, and through better access to 
veterinarian services. 
•  enhance agriculture extension services to assist farmers in adopting new technologies. 
•  develop new processed food products (e.g. new fruit drinks, new vegetable stuffing) from 
the agricultural products of these least developed countries. 
A key component of a science-led growth strategy for the developing countries is the 
mobilisation of their universities to be drivers of growth. The donor community should expand 
and upgrade these universities, especially their agricultural, scientific and technical departments. 
The universities should adopt incentive schemes to promote university-business partnerships that 
improve production techniques, and develop new products, especially those that are based on the 
regional resource base. The universities in the poorest nations must, of course, give high priority 
to agricultural development by working collaboratively with the new regional agricultural 
research centres to effect technology transfers to farmers. 
The truth is that the Washington Consensus (especially the Mark 1 version) is really an 
economic programme that is focused myopically on short and medium-term stabilisation of 
output, prices, and the balance of payments, and not on long-run sustained growth, particularly in 
the poorest countries. This accountant’s approach to economic management means that little 
attention is given to national specificities because accounting statements are the same 
everywhere in the world (even though the same outcomes might have been generated by 
different sets of factors). Why is there this accountant’s mentality toward economic 
management? 
The answer to this question brings us to the final fundamental defect of Washington 
Consensus Mark 2. Washington Consensus Mark 2, despite its obsession with getting institutions   34
right, misses a serious institutional defect in its own intellectual backyard. It ignores the 
institutional weaknesses in the international financial and development institutions, especially 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the need for root-and-branch reforms 
there. The recent negative experiences with the EEFSU economic transition and the Asian 
financial crisis show that bureaucratic inertia, operational convenience, and governance problems 
within the international financial and development institutions coalesced to produce the “one-
size-fits-all” type of policy packages. We have to change the incentives within existing 
international economic organisations (e.g. alter the voting structure in the IMF), and to create 
new international frameworks to deal with the increase in economic accidents created by greatly 
enhanced interactions from the accelerating pace of global economic integration (e.g. an 
international bankruptcy court), and to prevent the tragedy of the global commons caused by the 
trend of higher global economic growth (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol). Only by moving beyond the 
Washington Consensus, can we then move closer to achieving the dream of a richer, fairer, and 
greener world that the primogenitor of the Washington Consensus wished for us. 
In conclusion, it needs to be re-emphasised that the causes of underdevelopment are 
many. The reality is that countries differ in structure and in the international economic 
constraints they face; many combinations of different shocks produce similar readings on a 
number of economic indicators; and country characteristics and the international situation could 
change abruptly. Thus development economics becomes a farce whenever the epigones of 
neoclassical economics apply the Washington Consensus uncritically or, worse, elevate it to the 
status of universal truths.  
The frequent focus on the role of poor governance and inappropriate economic 
institutions (e.g. over-regulation, ignorance and corruption) is correct but not sufficient.   35
Démurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao, Chang, and Mellinger (2002), for example, have found that 
geographical factors have been just as important quantitatively as deregulation policies in the 
growth of the coastal provinces of China, and Bloom and Sachs (1998) have found poor health 
conditions to be absolute barriers to African development. Physical capital formation for 
overcoming geographical and health barriers is, however, unlikely to be the final nail into the 
coffin in which poverty would be laid to rest. We believe that only human capital formation can 
come up with better solutions to the centuries-old problem of poverty and to the looming 
challenge of global ecological Armageddon because there is still a lot about the complexities of 
science-led growth that we have yet to understand. These two challenges will be easier to 
overcome if we can empower every mind in the world to be capable of thinking creatively about 
them, which is why the developed nations must redouble its efforts to help the developing 
nations meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of the United Nations.
29 The common 
hope for a richer, fairer, and greener world will be realised if we can act collectively on this 
common agenda.  
 
                                                 
29 Details of the MDG programme to eliminate poverty can be found in the Human Development Report 
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Table 1: Growth and Development Indicators for Developing Countries and Regions
HDI rank         HDI Values GDP per capita, 2001 GDP per capita
2001 1975 2001 US$ PPP US$ annual growth rate
1975-2001 1990-2001
Developing countries 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.777 3,752 7,050 0.7 1.5
East Asia and the Pacific 0.722 1,267 4,233 5.9 5.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.468 475 1,831 -0.9 -0.1
34 Argentina 0.784 0.849 6,166 11,320 0.4 2.3
55 Mexico 0.684 0.800 6,214 8,430 0.9 1.5
69 Venezuela 0.715 0.775 5,073 5,670 -0.9 -0.6
105 El Salvador 0.595 0.719 2,147 5,260 0.1 2.4
30 Korea 0.701 0.879 8,917 15,090 6.2 4.7
58 Malaysia 0.615 0.790 3,699 8,750 4.1 3.9
74 Thailand 0.612 0.768 1,874 6,400 5.4 3.0
104 China 0.521 0.721 911 4,020 8.2 8.8
145 Zimbabwe 0.544 0.496 706 2,280 0.2 -0.2
151 Gambia 0.291 0.463 291 2,050 -0.2 0.1
163 Zambia 0.462 0.386 354 780 -2.2 -1.7
175 Sierra Leone na 0.275 146 470 -3.3 -6.6
Notes
Above data are from Human Development Report 2003
Taiwan has a GDP per capita of US$12, 876 in 2001.
HDI = Human Development IndexTable 2: Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Differences in Income and Technology
  Levels: Technological Gap is Wider than Income Gap
Ranking of Ranking of
GDP per  Technology GDP per  Technology
capita in 2000 Level capita in 2000 Level
(PPP US$) (out of 75) (PPP US$) (out of 75)
East Asia Latin America
1. The Four Dragons
Hong Kong 25,153 33 Argentina 12,311 48
Singapore 23,356 18 Chile 9,417 42
Korea 17,380 9 Mexico 9,023 36








East Asia 13,200 28 Latin America 8925 46
  4 Dragons 20,778 16
  ASEAN-4 5,621 41
1.  Latin America Level as % of East Asian Level 68 62
2.  Argentina-Brazil-Mexico-Chile Level as 
 % of Malaysia-Thailand-Philippines Level 148 76
Notes
Ranking of Technology Level is from The Global Competitveness Report 2001-2002 (GCR)
PPP GDP data from Human Development Report 2002, except that for Taiwan which is from GCR  1
Figure 1: Seeing the Forest: Overall Trade Orientation  
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Figure 2: Export Orientation in Latin America 
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Figure 3: Export Orientation in East Asia 
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